Both countries have been neutral and members of the European Union, which has its own security and defense arrangements, and are now likely to apply to join NATO. Finland has since been neutral since World War II and has long refused to join NATO amid a lack of popular support for the move. Sweden has been militarily neutral since the Napoleonic Wars over 200 years ago.

In Finland, polls have shown that support for membership had surged to well over 60% from below 20% since Russia invaded Ukraine.. “Everything changed when Russia invaded Ukraine,” said Prime Minister Sanna Marin. “I think people’s mind-sets in Finland, also in Sweden, changed and shifted very dramatically because of Russia’s actions.” Most political parties in Helsinki now also agree Finland should become a member to boost its security

Finland could apply to join NATO within weeks, Prime Minister Sanna Marin said Wednesday after a government report concluded that joining the alliance would boost security in the region.

In Sweden, the government commissioned a security policy review that will assess NATO membership as an option. It is set to be completed before parliamentary elections in September. NATO membership is expected to be a key issue in the election.

NATO officials have signaled that both countries would be immediately welcomed into the alliance, but the approval process could take up to a year.

The new strategy of the EU, known as the 'strategic compass', will lead to the creation of a strong EU rapid deployment capacity of up to 5,000 troops, regular live exercises on land and at sea, a substantial increase in member states' defense expenditures to reduce military gaps and stronger investments in defense research and development.

The rapid deployment capacity is to start exercises in 2023 and be operational by 2025. The EU operational HQ to lead forces is a matter for future negotiations. One of the notable aspects of the compass is that it underlines the mutual-assistance article of the EU Treaty, which obligates members to aid “by all means in their power” those members facing armed aggression", similarly to NATO's Article 5.

The invasion of Ukraine on 24 February sealed the deal, otherwise difficult to achieve among members of the EU with different approaches to ways how European defense should be achieved. On top of massive sanctions, which boosted the EU's geopolitical credentials, The strategic compass should further that. Even so, the adoption of the strategic review with a joint threat assessment and detailed objectives on EU security and defense, represents a little step forward in matters of EU defense, and of course, far from the creation of a European army, the EU has shown that it can be a capable security actor with its own defense capabilities.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought European countries together, concentrating on the larger threat to European security presented by Russia. In a speech to the European Parliament (on March 1^st ) Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, asserted that “European security and defense has evolved more in the last six days than in the last two decades.”

In many ways, European security and defense depends on resistance to Russian aggression. About two dozen European countries even formerly neutral ones are sending arms into Ukraine to fight off Russian invaders.

The European fund being used for assistance measures is called the European Peace Facility. The EPF was established two years ago as an off-budget instrument aimed at enhancing the Union's ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security, by enabling the financing of operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have military or defence implications. It has a financial ceiling of 5.7 billion euros - about $6.4 billion - for the seven-year budget from 2021 to 2027.

In February, March, and April 2022, the Council approved a total of €1.5 billion in funding under the EPF to support the Ukrainian armed forces. Money will be used to finance the provision of equipment and supplies such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel, as well as military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force for defensive purposes.

On February 27, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a revolution in the way Berlin will conduct foreign and defense policy in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Berlin is creating a €100 billion ($113 billion) special defense budget to fund equipment purchases and upgrades, with a pledge to exceed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s target of 2% of gross domestic product spent on defense each year. Germany will treat energy as a national-security matter and wean itself off Russian natural gas.

The magnitude of these massive changes includes rethinking Berlin’s role in Europe and the world from a pacifier to more of a geopolitical actor. The strategic culture of Germany has been built up to now on repentance, not on realpolitik, including an attempt to be the bridge between the U.S. and Russia.

The new German lead will transform European security but still leaves many questions open, among others about new policy toward Russia, and consequences to the EU as a security actor. The new policy to be implemented, Germany should do many policy steps, institutional transformations, and national cultural renewal.

With regard to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is a feeling that the German foreign policy shift is too little and too late. Germany can be seen as partly responsible for the disaster, thanks to its engagements with Russia and pacifist foot-dragging on providing arms to Ukraine. For some Berlin critics, Ukraine’s recent (early April) rejection of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s proposed visit to Kyiv comes as belated vindication.